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Abstract
Throughput limitations of existing blockchain architectures are well documented and are one of
the most significant hurdles for their wide-spread adoption. Attempts to address this challenge
include layer-2 solutions, such as Bitcoin’s Lightning or Ethereum’s Plasma network, that move
work off the main chain. Another prominent technique is sharding, i.e., breaking the network
into many interconnected networks. However, these scaling approaches significantly increase the
complexity of the programming model by breaking ACID guarantees (Atomicity, Consistency,
Isolation, and Durability), increasing the cost and time for application development.
In this paper, we describe a novel approach where we split the work traditionally assigned
to cryptocurrency miners into two different node roles. Specifically, the selection and ordering
of transactions are performed independently from their execution. The focus of this paper is
to formalize the split of consensus and computation, and prove that this approach increases
throughput without compromising security.
In contrast to most existing proposals, our approach achieves scaling via separation of con-
cerns, i.e., better utilization of network resources, rather than sharding. This approach allows
established programming paradigms for smart contracts (which generally assume transactional
atomicity) to persist without introducing additional complexity. We present simulations on a
proof-of-concept network of 32 globally distributed nodes. While the consensus algorithm was
identical in all simulations (a 2-step-commit protocol with rotating block proposer), block com-
putation was either included in a consensus nodes’ regular operations (conventional architecture)
or delegated to specialized execution nodes (separation of concerns). Separation of concerns en-
ables our system to achieve a throughput increase by a factor of 56 compared to conventional
architectures without loss of safety or decentralization.
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1 Introduction
The original Bitcoin blockchain uses a consensus model referred to as Nakamoto consensus [1].
It uses a sequential model in which a block is built, mined, and verified, and consensus about
it is formed by nodes building subsequent blocks on top of it. While the proof-of-work challenge
(mining) that must be solved for every block provides tamper-resistance for the chain, the associated
computational effort limits block-production rate and transaction throughput. The throughput
limitations of existing blockchain architectures are well documented and among the most significant
hurdles for the wide-spread adoption of decentralized technology [2, 3, 4].
The leading proposals for removing the overhead of proof-of-work adapt Byzantine Fault Tolerant
(BFT) consensus algorithms [5, 6]. Blockchains using proof-of-work (PoW) require exceptional
computational effort and, subsequently, electric power. In contrast, finalizing blocks through BFT
consensus is highly efficient but requires a known set of participants, a super-majority of which
must be honest.
Combining BFT consensus with proof-of-stake (PoS) [7] allows for the creation of a permission-
less network with strong security properties. Under PoS, all participating nodes are required to
deposit a (financial) stake that can be taken away if they violate the protocol’s rules. The amount
of influence given to each node is proportional to its fraction of total stake. Then the economic pres-
sure (i.e., the stake at risk) to follow the protocol is correlated with a node’s influence. In addition,
the deposited stake has the added benefit of preventing Sybil attacks [8, 9, 10]. PoS systems promise
to increase the throughput of the chain while also decreasing the total capital costs associated with
maintaining the security of the chain. Even including the performance increases through adopting
PoS, throughput restrictions are remaining the major challenge for wide-spread adoption [11, 12].
In this paper, we explore a novel approach to increasing the throughput of PoS blockchains. While
PoS blockchain proposals remove proof-of-work as the dominant sink of computational effort, they
tend to inherit most of their architecture from the proof-of-work systems of the previous generation.
In particular, every full node in the network is required to examine and execute each proposed block
to update their local copy of the blockchain’s state. As every transaction needs to be processed by
every single node, adding nodes to the system provides no benefit in throughput or scale. Instead,
adding nodes reduces the throughput of most BFT consensus protocols, because the message com-
plexity to finalize a block increases super-linearly with the number of consensus nodes (see section
3.1 for details). Consequently, most PoS blockchains have to make a trade-off between a small
consensus committee (weakening security) or a low block production rate (decreasing throughput).
For networks unwilling to compromise either security or decentralization, the most common ap-
proach to addressing the scaling problem has been through sharding [2] or moving work off the main
chain (e.g. Lightning [13] or Plasma [14] network). Both of these approaches, unfortunately, place
significant limitations on the ability of transactions to access state that is distributed throughout
the network [15]. These limitations dramatically increase the complexity required for developers
who wish to deploy smart contract-based applications.
Our proposal, the Flow architecture, addresses these limitations by fundamentally changing how the
blockchain is formed. Flow decouples the selection and ordering of transactions from their execution
so that both processes can run in parallel. The decoupling enables significantly higher transaction
throughput than other blockchains architectures, without undermining security or participation
rates.
3
Traditional blockchain architectures require a commitment to the result of each block’s state
update to be included as part of the consensus process. As a result, every node must reproduce the
state-update computation before it can finalize a block. Our finding is that consensus on the order1
of transactions in the block is all that is required. Once that order is fixed, the resulting computation
is determined even though it may not necessarily be known. Thereby, the computational effort of
participating in consensus is significantly reduced, even for a very large number of transactions. Once
the transaction order is determined, ensuing processes can be delegated to perform the computation
itself, without affecting decentralization of the system.
Our main body of work is section 3, where we discuss and prove our central theorem, which
states that one can separate the majority of computation and communication load from consensus
without compromising security. Section 4 complements the theoretical discussion by benchmarking
the Flow architecture on an experimental network. We conclude the paper by outlining the future
work that would be required to implement a system based on these ideas in section 5.
The focus of this paper is to formalize the split of consensus and computation and prove that this
approach increases throughput while maintaining strong security guarantees. A blockchain designed
around the principles outlined in this paper would need to specify a variety of additional mechanisms
including:
• a full protocol for verifying computation results,
• details of the consensus algorithm,
• and adequate compensation and slashing mechanics to incentivize nodes to comply with the
protocol.
Detailed formalization and analysis of these topics is reserved for follow-up publications.
1.1 Terminology
While most current blockchains focus solely on processing financial transactions, we consider a
blockchain as a general, Turing-complete, distributed computing platform. Instead of referring
to the blockchain as a ledger, we adopt the terminology of a distributed state machine wherein
transactions describe transitions between computational states. Furthermore, we use the term
consensus to refer only to linearizing the order of state transitions (but do not consider agreement
about the computational result as a part of consensus).
1.2 Related Work
Blockchains supporting Turing-complete computation generally impose an upper limit on the com-
putation within one block, such as Ethereum’s gas limit. Such a gas limit, in turn, introduces
undesired throughput restrictions. One reason for imposing a gas limit in the first place is to avoid
the Verifier’s Dilemma [16]. By setting the gas limit low enough, the time investment for verification
is negligible compared to solving the PoW challenge for mining the block. Thereby, the gas limit
ensures that performing the verification work does not introduce a pivotal disadvantage for a node
to successfully mine the next block.
1In the full Flow architecture, Consensus Nodes work with transaction batches (collections). A block contains collec-
tion hashes and a source of randomness, which the Execution Nodes use to shuffle the transactions before computing
them. While Consensus Nodes don’t directly compute the transaction order for a block, they implicitly determine
the order by specifying all the inputs to the deterministic algorithm that computes the order. The detailed protocol
is specified in a follow-up publication.
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For PoS blockchain, the Verifier’s Dilemma persists when incentives are given for speedy opera-
tion. Especially for high-throughput blockchains, the verification of a large number of transactions
consumes significant computational resources and time. By separating consensus and computation,
the Verifier’s Dilemma for checking correctness of the execution result is of no concern anymore to
the consensus nodes2. The maximum amount of computation in a block (the block’s gas limit) can
now be increased without the consensus nodes affected by Verifier’s Dilemma or slowed down by
the computation work. However, the Verifier’s Dilemma still needs to be solved for the verifiers of
the computation. Potential solutions include zkSnarks [17], Bulletproofs [18], and TrueBit’s approach
[19]. For Flow, we developed Specialized Proofs of Confidential Knowledge (SPoCKs) to overcome the
Verifier’s Dilemma, which is described in detail in a follow-up paper.
Another limitation for blockchains are the resource demands to store and update the large com-
putational state. In Ethereum, the gas limit is also used to control the rate at which the state
grows [20]. By delegating the responsibility to maintain the large state to specialized nodes, hard-
ware requirements for consensus nodes can remain moderate even for high-throughput blockchains.
This design increases decentralization as it allows for high levels of participation in consensus by
individuals with suitable consumer hardware on home internet connections.
The concept of separating the issue of transaction ordering from the effort of computing the results
of the computations has been previously explored in the context of distributed databases [21, 22].
Here, transactions are ordered into a log through a quorum (consensus), and subsequently each node
can independently resolve transaction effects. However, these systems are designed for operation in
well-maintained data-centers where Byzantine faults are not concern. Specifically, the number of
participating nodes is small, and node failure modes are restricted to dropouts.
Within the blockchain space, the Ekiden [23] paper describes a system where consensus is sep-
arated from computation, with the goal of preserving the privacy of the contract execution envi-
ronment. The paper, which explains part of the Oasis blockchain technology [24], notes that this
approach leads to improved performance. But it does not quantify the performance gain or prove
that the resulting system maintains security.
2The Verifier’s Dilemma (checking the correctness of the execution result) is of no concern anymore to the Consensus
Nodes. However, checking cryptographic signatures and proofs in PoS can still require noticeable computational
work. Delay through verifying signatures might induce a Verifier’s Dilemma for the consensus nodes Though, on a
much smaller scale compared to requiring the consensus nodes to re-execute all transactions.
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2 Architecture Overview
The Flow architecture is founded on the principle of ‘separation of concerns’. The network has
specialized roles: Consensus Nodes and Execution Nodes. The core differentiation between the two
node types is Objectivity vs. Subjectivity. Objective tasks are those for which there is an objectively
correct answer. Any traditional mathematical calculation is objective; you don’t need an authority
or expert to confirm the correctness of 2+2 = 4, or to confirm that an actor that claims 2+2 = 5 is
Byzantine. Subjective tasks have no such deterministic solution. Most human governance systems
(“laws”) typically deal with subjective issues. At different times in different societies, the rules about
who can do certain things can be very different. The definition of the word consensus means the
agreement on subjective problems, where there is no single correct answer. Instead, one answer
must be selected through mutual agreement.
Blockchains combine objective rules with a decentralized mechanism for resolving subjective
problems. One example is if two transactions are submitted at the same time that try to spend the
same coins (e.g., no double-spends), which one resolves correctly, and which one fails? Traditional
blockchain architectures ask the nodes participating in the network to solve both kinds of problems
at the same time. In Flow, the Consensus Nodes are tasked with all subjective questions, while the
Execution Nodes are responsible solely for fully deterministic, objective problems. While we reserve
a detailed discussion of the nodes’ roles, tasks, and interactions for the follow-up paper, we briefly
define the Consensus Role and Execution Role for nodes. For an illustration, see Figure 1.
Consensus Role
Consensus Nodes form blocks from transaction data digests. Essentially, Consensus Nodes maintain
and extend the core Flow blockchain. An agreement to accept a proposed block needs to be reached
by many nodes which requires a Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant (BFT) consensus algorithm [5]. It should
be noted that the results in this paper hold for any BFT consensus algorithm with deterministic
finality.
In Flow, a block references its transaction and defines their execution order. However, a block
contains no commitment to the resulting computational state after block execution. Accordingly,
Consensus Nodes do not need to maintain the computational state or execute transactions.
Furthermore, Consensus Nodes adjudicate slashing requests from other nodes, for example claims
that an Execution Node has produced incorrect outputs.
Execution Role
Execution Nodes provide the raw computational power needed to determine the result of the transac-
tions when executed in the order determined by the Consensus Nodes. They produce cryptographic
attestations declaring the result of their efforts in the form of Execution Receipts. These receipts
Consensus 
Nodes
Transaction Data
(digest)
Finalized 
Blocks
Execution 
Nodes
Execution
Receipts
Figure 1: Overview of the message flow through Consensus and Execution Nodes. For brevity, only the
messages during normal operation are shown. Messages that are exchanged during the adjudication of
slashing requests are omitted.
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can be used to challenge the claims of an Execution Node when they are shown to be incorrect.
Also they are used to create proofs of the current state of the blockchain once they are known to
be correct. The verification process – by which Byzantine Receipts are rejected (and the Execution
Nodes which produced them are slashed), and by which valid receipts are accepted (and shared
with observers of the network) – is outside the scope of this paper and will be addressed in future
work.
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3 Theoretical Performance and Security Analysis
In this section, we present a theoretical derivation that one can separate the majority of computation
and communication load from consensus nodes without compromising security. Furthermore, we
provide an analysis that explains the source of the experimentally observed throughput increase.
Flow is designed to guarantee3 that any error introduced by the Execution Nodes maintains four
critical attributes:
• Detectable: A deterministic process has, by definition, an objectively correct output. There-
fore, even a single honest node in the network can detect deterministic faults, and prove the
error to all other honest nodes by pointing out the part of the process that was executed
incorrectly.
• Attributable: The output of all deterministic processes in Flow must be signed with the
identity of the node that generated those results. As such, any error that has been detected
can be clearly attributed to the node(s) that were responsible for that process.
• Punishable: All nodes participating in a Flow network, including Execution Nodes, must
put up a stake that can be slashed if they are found to have exhibited Byzantine behaviour.
Since all errors in deterministic processes are detectable and attributable, those errors can be
reliably punished via slashing.
• Recoverable: The system must have a means to undo errors as they are detected. The
property serves to deter malicious actors from inducing errors that benefit them more than
the slashing penalty.
An important property of this design is that for each system-internal operation, the participants
are accountable. Specifically, for all operations except for the Consensus Nodes, the execution of
each operation is delegated to a subset of nodes, the operation processors. Verifying the outcome is
assigned to a disjoint node set, the operation verifiers. Informally, the protocol works as follows:
• Both operation processor and operation verifier groups are chosen at random. The selection
of nodes uses a verifiable random function [25], such that the outcome is deterministic but
resistant to hash grinding.
• The inclusion probability for a node in either group is proportional to its stake. This enforces
that Byzantine actors must lock up a significant amount of stake in order to have a non-
negligible probability of affecting the system. Specifically, this hardens the system against
Sybil attacks [26].
• The required amount of stake for both groups is set sufficiently high such that the probability
of sampling only Byzantine actors in both groups is sufficiently small.
• As long as at least one honest node is involved in either group, the honest node will detect
and flag any error.
• If a potential error is flagged, the case is adjudicated by the Consensus Nodes, malicious nodes
are slashed, and the operation’s outcome is rejected if faulty.
The process above guarantees that malicious Execution Nodes are slashed with near certainty.
Furthermore, it is nearly impossible for the malicious actors to succeed with introducing an error.
A question that might arise is why Flow has separate groups of operation processors and operation
verifiers instead of the operation processors verifying each other’s results. We chose this separation
of concern to address the Verifier’s Dilemma [16]. Without a dedicated verifier role, there is a
3In Flow, guarantees are probabilistic. Specifically, errors are detected and corrected with probability p = 1 − ε for
0 < ε 1. Through system parameters, ε is tuned such that the desired properties hold with near certainty.
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conflict of interest for an operation processor to compute the next block vs. verifying (re-computing)
the last block’s result. In Flow, this dilemma is alleviated by dedicated operation verifiers who
are compensated solely for verification. The technical details of our block verification protocol are
presented in the follow-up paper, including a solution to the ‘freeloader problem’ (verifiers just
approving any result without doing the actual computation) and ‘maliciously flagging’ (verifiers
challenging correct results to congest the network).
The following theorem formalizes the security guarantees of the Flow architecture and proves
that introducing an error into the system by publishing or approving faulty results is economically
infeasible.
Theorem 1 (Probabilistic security for delegation of work to small groups)
Introducing an error into the system by deliberately publishing or approving faulty results is eco-
nomically infeasible, if the following conditions hold for any operation, except for those from the
Consensus Nodes.
1. The operation is delegated to two sets of randomly selected nodes:
(a) set of operation processors: members of this group execute the operation and provide
cryptographically secure commitments to their result
(b) set of operation verifiers: members of this group verify the operation’s result and provide
cryptographically secure commitments to the result if they approve
2. Both groups can be relatively small as long as the probability of choosing only Byzantine actors
in both groups at the same time is sufficiently low.
3. At the time the operation processors generate the result, the membership of the operation verifier
group is unknown to them.
4. Consensus Nodes
(a) either verify that a significant majority have committed to the published outcome and
there are no objections raised by participating nodes
(b) or adjudicate objections, determine the faulty nodes (attributable), and slash them (pun-
ishable).
It is essential to highlight that Consensus Nodes are not required to check the correctness of the
results of an operation. Instead, they ensure that other nodes with sufficient stake are accountable for
the verification. Furthermore, Theorem 1 holds for any BFT consensus algorithm with deterministic
finality.
Proof of Theorem 1:
We will show that Theorem 1 can always be satisfied under realistic conditions where
• at least one of the two groups is sampled from a large population with a super-majority of
honest nodes;
• Byzantine actors cannot suppress communication between correct nodes, i.e., if there is one
honest node objecting to the result and proving its faultiness, the erroneous nodes will be
slashed.
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Specifically, let us consider a population of N nodes from which we want to randomly draw a
subset with n nodes. Furthermore, we assume that there are at most M < N/3 Byzantine nodes.
In the following, we focus on the case where all nodes are equally-staked4, i.e., their inclusion
probabilities are identical. Drawing an n-element subset falls in the domain of simple random
sampling [27] without replacement. The probability of drawing m ≤ n Byzantine nodes is given by
the hypergeometric distribution5
Pn,N,M (m) =
(
M
m
)(
N−M
n−m
)(
N
n
) . (1)
The probability of a successful attack, P (successful attack), requires that there is no honest node
that would contradict a faulty result. Hence,
P (successful attack) ≤ Pn,N,M (n), (2)
where Pn,N,M (n) is the probability of sampling only Byzantine nodes.
P
k,N,M
(k) =
M !
N !
(N − k)!
(M − k)! for k ≤M (3)
⇒ Pn,N,M (n)Pn+1,N,M (n+ 1)
=
(N − n)!
(N − (n+ 1))!
(M − (n+ 1))!
(M − n)! =
N − n
M − n > 1 (4)
As eq. (4) shows, the probability of sampling only Byzantine nodes is strictly monotonously decreas-
ing with increasing n. Eq. (4) states that the larger the sample size n, the smaller the probability
to sample only Byzantine node.
For a node to deliberately attack the network by publishing a faulty result or approving such,
we assume the existence of some reward r which the node receives in case its attack succeeds.
However, if the attack is discovered, the node is slashed by an amount ξ (by convention positive).
The resulting statistically expected revenue from attacking the network is
revenue = P (successful attack) · r − (1− P (successful attack)) · ξ (5)
(2)
≤ Pn,N,M (n) · r − (1− Pn,N,M (n)) · ξ (6)
For the attack to be economically viable, one requires 0
!≤ revenue, which yields the central result
of this proof:
r
ξ
≥ 1Pn,N,M (n)
− 1 . (7)
4The argument can be extended to nodes with different stakes. In this case, each node would have an inclusion
probability equal to its fraction of total stake. However, the probability of sampling fully Byzantine groups is
depending on the specific fractions of total stake for the individual nodes. A basic solution for allowing nodes with
different stakes is to introduce a unit quantity % of stake. For a node with the stake s, the multiplicity k = bs/%c
represents how many full staking units the node possesses. For operational purposes (including voting and node
selection), the blockchain treats the node identically to k independent nodes each having stake %.
5For conciseness, we only handle the case m ≤M . For m > M , Pn,N,M (m) = 0 per definition.
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Furthermore, eq. (4) implies that r/ξ increases strictly monotonously with increasing n. Using
results from [28], one can show that r/ξ grows exponentially with n for n < N/2.
The left-hand side of equation (7), r/ξ, is a measure of security as it represents the statistical
cost to attack the system in the scenario where an attacker bribes nodes into byzantine behavior. As
an example, let us consider the case with N = 1000, M = 333, n = 10. For simplicity, assume that
for publishing or approving a faulty result, the node’s entire stake is slashed. Then, for an attack to
be economically viable the success reward r would need to be 65 343 times the node’s stake. If the
operation verifiers staked $1000 each, an attacker would have to expend $65.3 million on average to
cover all the slashing costs. It would be cheaper for the attacker to run the entire pool of operation
verifiers instead of attempting to slip an error past the honest verifiers. When increasing n even
further to n = 20, an attacker would need to expend r/ξ = 5.2 · 109 times the stake to slip a single
error past a super-majority of honest verifiers.
In summary, we have analyzed the case where either processing an operation or verifying its
result is delegated to a small, random subset of a much larger population of nodes. We have shown
that under realistic assumptions, introducing an error into the system by publishing or approving
faulty results is economically infeasible. Note that this result only covers node types other than
Consensus Nodes. Hence, it is sufficient for the Consensus Nodes to check that enough nodes have
participated in executing the operation as well as verifying it. However, they do not need to check
the result itself to problematically guarantee its integrity.

Theorem 1 is a key insight, as it allows us to:
• separate the majority of computation and communication load from consensus;
• develop highly specialized nodes with distinct requirement profiles (as opposed to having one
node type that has to have outstanding performance in all domains or otherwise diminish the
network throughput);
While other nodes verify each others’ operations in small groups, the entire committee of Consensus
Nodes audits themselves.
3.1 Special Role of Consensus Nodes
Consensus Nodes determine the relative time order of events through a BFT consensus algorithm.
While our results hold for any BFT consensus algorithm with deterministic finality, HotStuff [29, 30]
is the leading contender. However, we continue to assess other algorithms such as Casper CBC
[31, 32, 33] or Fantômette [34].
In contrast to the operations of other nodes, which requires an auditing group to approve the
result, Consensus Nodes finalize blocks without external verification. While the contents of a block
can be verified and Consensus Nodes punished if they include invalid entries, blocks are not rebuilt
in this scenario, unlike other verification processes. External parties can inspect the finalized blocks
after the fact. However, in the event of a adversarial attack forking the chain, a double-spend
attack might have already succeeded at this point. To increase the resilience of the entire system,
the committee of Consensus Nodes should consist of as many staked nodes as possible.
For a simple BFT algorithm, the message complexity η per block (i.e., the total number of
messages sent by all N nodes) is O(N2) [7]. More advanced protocols achieve η ∈ O(N logN) [35]
or η ∈ O(c · N) [36, 37], for c  N an approximately constant value for large N . The overall
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bandwidth load B [MB/s] for the entire consensus committee is
B = β · b · η, (8)
for β the bock rate [s−1], b the message size [MB/s]. For a node receiving a messagem and processing
it, imposes a latency
L(m) = f(b) + process(m), (9)
where f denotes the network transmission time for receiving m and process(m) represents the
computation time for processingm. It is apparent that both B and L strongly impact the throughput
of the consensus algorithm. The specific details are highly dependent on the chosen BFT protocol,
as well as the employed gossip topology [38]. Other factors include delays or bandwidth limitations
in the underlying network hardware.
Currently, we are targeting a consensus committee on the order of several thousand nodes. To
support decentralization and transparency, hardware requirements for Consensus Nodes should be
limited such that private groups can still afford to run a node and participate in consensus. Hence,
given a desired minimal block rate (e.g., β = 1blocks ) and an environment-determined function f ,
the consensus committee can be increased only by decreasing message size b or process(m).
For completeness, we provide a brief outlook on how we simultaneously reduce b and process(m)
in Flow. For the detailed mechanics of the respective processes, the reader is referred to subsequent
papers.
• We delegate the computation of the transactions to the specialized Execution Nodes. The
delegation removes the need for Consensus Nodes to maintain and compute state, which
significantly reduces process(m).
• Consensus Nodes do not require the full transaction texts during normal operation. Instead,
specialized Collector Nodes receive transactions from external clients and prepackage them into
batches, called collections. Consensus Nodes only order collection references (hashes), which
substantially reduces the messages size b compared to handing individual transaction texts.
Low Latency Finality
Low Overhead
Small Number of Nodes
Low Latency Finality
High Overhead
Large Number of Nodes
High Latency Finality
Low Overhead
Large Number of Nodes
Figure 2: Zamfir’s triangle of compromises;
orange: Consensus Nodes; blue: Execution Nodes.
We conclude this section by comparing our ap-
proach with the ‘triangle of compromises’ pro-
posed by Vlad Zamfir [39], which we re-create
in Figure 2. The triangle illustrates Zamfir’s
impossibility conjecture for proof of stake sys-
tems. While the conjecture has not been proven
formally, we concur that the compromises are
correctly identified. However, Flow optimizes
where these compromises are made:
• Consensus Nodes work as part of a large
consensus committee for maximal secu-
rity. To ensure security and fast genera-
tion of finalized blocks, we accept a higher
communication overhead (the bottom-left
corner of the triangle). However, unlike
other blockchains, this consensus only determines the order of transactions within a block,
but not the resulting state. The architecture compensates for the resulting bandwidth higher
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overhead by minimizing message size through the use of collection references (references to
batches of transactions) instead of full individual transactions. To further increase throughput
and reduce communication latency, all possible computation is delegated to other node types.
• The Execution Nodes unpack the collections and process individual transactions. Without a
large number of Byzantine actors involved, this can be handled directly between the Collector
and Execution Nodes without involving Consensus Nodes. Furthermore, tasks can be paral-
lelized and processed by small groups which hold each other accountable for correct results.
Only during Byzantine attacks, malicious actions would be reported to Consensus Nodes to
adjudicate slashing.
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4 Performance Simulations
The theoretical analysis presented in section 3.1 suggests that transaction throughput can be in-
creased by separating consensus about the transaction order from their execution. However, the
theoretical analysis makes no assertion as to what the realistically achievable speedup is, as through-
put heavily depends on a variety of environmental parameters such as message round-trip time, CPU
performance, etc. Therefore, we have implemented a simplified benchmark network that solely fo-
cuses on transaction ordering (consensus) and transaction execution.
4.1 Experimental Setup
In a 2015 study analyzing the distribution of computational power in the Bitcoin network [40],
the authors estimated that 75% of the mining power was provided by roughly 2% of the nodes.
We simulated a system whose centralization metrics are roughly half of the Bitcoin scores. In
our simulations, roughly 38% computational power is provided by the fast nodes, which represent
approximately 6% of the nodes. For the remaining 62% of the network’s total computational
power, we have applied a less-extreme ratio: two-third of the nodes (slow nodes) hold one-third of
the remaining computational power (i.e., 62%/3 ' 20% of the total computational power). The
remainder is assigned to medium nodes.
To assign the Execution role to nodes with the most computation power requires incentive
mechanisms that compensate nodes for the resources used by the network. Assuming the existence
of such incentive mechanisms, it is economically rational for a fast node to stake as an Execution
Node. In any other role, its resources would not be utilized to the maximum potential leading to
diminished revenue. Hence, we assumed that the most powerful nodes would stake specifically to
become Execution Nodes.
We conducted three different experiments. The common characteristics of all simulations are de-
scribed in the following. Section 4.1.1 to 4.1.3 present the specific details for each individual exper-
iment. Figure 3 illustrates the different setups. For each experiment, the network resources (node
types) and the assignment of responsibilities are given in Table 1.
Slow Nodes Medium Nodes Fast Nodes
Experiment (I): number of nodes 20 10 2
role of nodes consensus consensus compute
Experiment (II) number of nodes 20 10 2
role of nodes consensus consensus consensusand compute and compute and compute
Experiment (III) number of nodes 32
role of nodes consensusand compute
Table 1: Network configuration for each experiment.
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. . . 
. . . 
(I)
slow node medium node fast node
consensus com- 
pute 
. . . 
. . . 
consensus  
and compute
. . . 
consensus  
and compute
. . . 
(II) (III)
Figure 3: Illustration of experiments. (I) Flow network with the division of consensus and compute;
(II) Conventional PoS network containing nodes with different performance levels; (III) Conventional
PoS network containing only slow nodes.
Common Characteristics
Transactions: For simplicity, our network was processing benchmark transactions, which all had
identical complexity (number of instructions). Batches of benchmark transactions were directly
generated by the Consensus Nodes instead of integrating a dedicated submission process into the
simulation.
Network: We implemented a relatively small network of 32 nodes, were each node ran on a dedicated
Google Cloud instance. The nodes were spread over 8 data centres across the world to provide
somewhat realistic latencies.
Nodes: Depending on the experiment (see Table 1), transactions were executed on nodes with
different hardware:
• slow nodes: process a benchmark transaction in approximately 10ms
• medium nodes: five times as fast as slow nodes, i.e., process a benchmark transaction in 5ms
• fast nodes: 25 times as fast as slow nodes, i.e., process a benchmark transaction in 2.5ms
To facilitate decentralization, an ideal network should allow any participant to join, requiring only a
minimal node performance. Consequently, a realistic network will contain a majority of slow nodes,
some medium nodes and very few fast nodes.
Consensus: We implemented a Tendermint-inspired consensus algorithm with a rotating bock pro-
poser. As our goal was to benchmark achievable throughput in the absence of a large-scale Byzantine
attack, our benchmark network only consists of honest nodes. The proposed blocks contain a vari-
able number of t benchmark transactions, where t is drawn uniform randomly from the integer
interval [240, 480]. However, for repeatability, we seeded the random number generator such that
in all experiment, the same sequence of 20 blocks was proposed and finalized.
4.1.1 Experiment (I): Flow PoS network with the split of consensus and compute
This experiment simulates a network with the division of consensus and compute:
• 20 slow nodes and 10 medium nodes form the consensus committee. They agree on the order
of transactions within a block but don’t store or update the chain’s computational state.
• Two fast nodes execute the transactions in the order they are finalized in the blocks. They do
not participate in consensus.
For further illustration, see Figure 3(I) and Table 1.
In the Flow network, blocks only specify the transaction order, but there is no information about
the resulting state included. As consensus in this model only covers the transaction order, consensus
nodes are oblivious about the computational state.
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4.1.2 Experiment (II): PoS network of nodes with diverse performances
Experiment (II) closely models conventional BFT consensus systems such as Tendermint [41, 42, 43]
or Hot-Stuff [29]. The network is identical to Experiment (I), i.e., it consists of exactly the same
types and numbers of nodes (see Table 1 and Fig. 3(II) for details and illustration). Though, blocks
contain the transaction order and a hash commitment to the resulting computational state. Due
to this result commitment, each consensus node must repeat the computation of all transactions
for a proposed block to validate its correctness. In essence, there is only one role for a node: to
participate in the consensus algorithm, which includes the task of updating the computational state.
4.1.3 Experiment (III): PoS network of nodes with uniform performance
Experiment (III), illustrated in Figure 3(III), simulates a network of 32 nodes with uniform compu-
tational performance. As in Experiment (II), all nodes execute the same algorithm which combines
consensus about transaction ordering with their computation.
4.2 Experimental Results
Our simulations aim at benchmarking the transaction throughput. For each experiment, we sent
7995 benchmark transactions through the network and measured the corresponding processing time.
The results are summarized in Table 2.
Experiment (I) and (II) were executed with the same network configuration. The only difference
was the separation of consensus and compute in the experiment (I), while both were combined in the
experiment (II). In our moderately simplified model, separating compute from consensus increased
the throughput approximately by a factor of 56.
Comparing experiment (II) and (III) illustrates the limited impact of increasing network re-
sources compared. In terms of instructions per seconds, the network in the experiment (II) is 3.75
times more powerful6 than in the experiment (III). However, the throughput of (II) increased only
by 0.7% compared to the experiment (III).
As the results show, separation of consensus and compute allows utilizing network resources more
efficiently. In a PoS network with combined consensus and compute, deterministic block finalization
requires a super-majority of nodes to vote in favor of a candidate block to be finalized. For may
6Let a slow node process x instructions per second. Hence, under ideal resource utilization, the network in the
experiment (III) can process 32x instructions. In contrast, the network in the experiment (III) processes 20x+ 10 ·
5x+ 2 · 25x = 120x.
Processing Time [s] Throughput [TX/s]
Experiment (I) 5.14 1555.4
Experiment (II) 291 27.5
Experiment (III) 293 27.3
Table 2: Network performances. Processing time for 7995 transactions in seconds [s] and the result-
ing transaction throughput [TX/s]. While we only conducted one-shot experiments, we have repeatedly
observed throughout implementation that processing times fluctuate only on the sub-second scale.
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BFT protocols, such as [29, 42, 44, 45], finalization requires supporting votes with an accumulated
fraction of stake S > 2/3. Though, some protocols have other limits, e.g., S > 80% for [46, 47]. All
of these protocols have in common that consensus nodes are obliged to execute the computation as
a sub-task to verifying the proposed block. Therefore, the time for finalizing a block is bound by the
fastest Sth percentile of nodes. Less formally, the slowest nodes determine the throughput of the
entire system. Consequently, running the network on stronger nodes leaves throughput unchanged
as long as the slowest (1 − S)-fraction of nodes do not receive performance upgrades. In contrast,
separation of consensus and compute significantly shifts computational load from the consensus
nodes to the fastest nodes in the network.
5 Further Work
A blockchain designed around the principles outlined in this paper would need to address additional
problems, the most notable being the mechanism that verifies computation outputs. On the one
hand, splitting consensus and compute work boosts the throughput of Flow. On the other hand,
special care has to be taken that the resulting states are correct as consensus nodes do not repeat
the computation.
Furthermore, in Flow, blocks no longer contain a hash commitment to the resulting state after
computing the block. Therefore, a node that receives data from a block state cannot verify the
validity of the received data based on the information published in the block. Nevertheless, a
hash commitment for the result of a previous block can be published in a later block after passing
verification. We will present the technical details of the block verification and commitment to the
computation results (referred to as block sealing) in the follow-up papers.
The presented simulations provide experimental evidence to support the theoretical work of this
paper. While the theoretical results (section 3) stand on their own without experimental validation,
the experiments could be extended significantly. For example, we have not accounted for the extra
steps required to verify computational states and commit them into the chain. Another aspect is
the size of the consensus committee. It would be interesting to study the scaling of transaction
throughput with different committees sizes of consensus and execution nodes. However, we have
decided to prioritize implementing the Flow architecture over benchmarking a simplified model
system. Throughput and other performance characteristics will be measured and published as soon
as a full-fledged implementation is completed.
6 Conclusions
In this proof-of-concept work, we have demonstrated that a separation of consensus and compute can
lead to significantly increased resource utilization within PoS blockchain networks. For conventional
round-based PoS networks, where one block is finalized before the subsequent block is proposed, the
throughput is limited by a small fraction of the slowest nodes. In contrast, separation of consensus
and compute significantly shifts computational load from the consensus nodes to the fastest nodes
in the network. We have shown in Theorem 1 that such separation of concern does not compromise
the network’s security. First experiments suggest that the throughput improvements enabled by
such a separation of concerns are drastic. In a moderately simplified model, our simulations show
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a throughput increase by a factor of 56 compared to architectures with combined consensus and
block computation.
One way to substantially increase the throughput of existing blockchains, such as Ethereum, could
be to increase the gas limit. However, this would accelerate the rate at which the state grows making
it harder for new nodes to join the system. While in conventional proof-of-work blockchains the
computational load to maintain and update the state is uniform across all (full) nodes, the large
majority of the computation resources are concentrated in a small fraction of mining nodes [40].
The Flow architecture utilizes the resource imbalance naturally occurring within a network
ecosystem. The few data-center-scale nodes with massive computational and bandwidth capacities
can stake to become Execution Nodes to contribute their resources most efficiently. In contrast,
Consensus Nodes do not store or maintain the state and, therefore, can be run on off-the-shelf
consumer hardware. With such separation of concerns, sharing a large state with new Execution
Nodes joining the system should not pose a substantial challenge given the operational resources
available to nodes with this role.
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